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Resumo
Na perspectiva do autor, a CSCE/OSCE, du-
rante a Guerra Fria, excedeu as expectativas
aquando da sua criação em 1975. Confrontada
com o novo contexto internacional, a organi-
zação ou se adapta às novas realidades ou
estará condenada ao desaparecimento. Por essa
razão, a OSCE tem-se concentrado bastante nos
problemas do combate ao terrorismo e ao
problema da imigração clandestina tendo como
fim a defesa da liberdade civil e a segurança
colectiva. Contudo, tal não invalida que a orga-
nização esteja em crise e precise de ser refor-
mada. A OSCE precisa de encontrar o seu papel
específico tirando vantagens da sua natureza
geograficamente alargada e por essa via melhor
dotada para resolver assuntos de foro multi-
cultural.
Abstract
According to the author, the OCSE/CSCE exceeded,
during the Cold War, the expectations for which it
was created in 1975. Confronted with the new
international context the organisation will have to
adjust itself or else it will be condemned to disappear.
For that reason, the organisation is, nowadays, much
concentrated on the fight against terrorism and
illegal immigration in order to protect civil freedom
and collective security. This does not invalidate the
fact the organization is going through a period of
crisis and that a reform will be needed, taking
advantages from its geographic scope and therefore
improving its capacity to deal with multicultural
issues.
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I would like to start by thanking the organizers of this Conference for inviting me to
express my views on a personal behalf and on behalf of the OSCE – PA as well.
At the same time I want to commend the organizers for convening this so much needed
international meeting on an important topic for the European security.
The OSCE has a glorious past. A lot of credit should go to that organization – the
former CSCE – for the victory of peace and freedom in a reunified Europe at the end of the
Cold War. The CSCE – today OSCE – was born in the e context of the bipolar system and
was officially established in order to civilize the disputes between the two blocs of enemies
ideologically opposed. It was also hoped that peace could be achieved through the
economic cooperation of the opponents as well as through the recognition of the geo-political
status quo established after the Second World War. It was proved that peace could not be
anything else than the absence of the war if the freedoms and civil rights are not
recognized. In fact the CSCE/OSCE achieved much more than it was expected. It animated
the human rights movement in the totalitarian soviet camp and generated a real network
of human rights activists across the European, Euro-Atlantic and Euro-Asiatic space. As a
result, I believe the Cold War had no winner states and no defeated states; and it will be
a mistake to think otherwise. The only winners were the principles of the pluralistic
democracy, freedom, rule of law and of the human rights, as well as the idea of the free and
open society of which they form the foundation. That is why the CSCE/OSCE brought not
only the peace but also a victory without a loser; not only a victory but a socio-political
revolution; not only a revolution but the re-unification of Europe.
Today, the post bi-polar world is different as compared with the Helsinki world or
1975. The OSCE should either adapt itself to the new realities or disappear.
In today’s OSCE area, a group of states which looks as a family of commitments rather
than a family of values is no more internally divided in ideological blocs but it is internally
confronted with an unfocused external enemy. The Cold War was succeeded by the war on
terror. The war between the totalitarian communism and the democratic freedom was
literally inter-national and focussed. The war of the post communist modernity against
terrorism is global and diffused.
The peace dividends from the collapse of the Soviet Union have not fully appeared,
either. The confrontation with the “Empire of the Darkness” was replaced by the
confrontation with the rogue states, the fallen states and the pseudo-states which reject any
responsibility towards the international order and in many cases are not even subjects of
the international law.
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During the Cold War the world suffered the bad consequences of the state sponsored
terrorism. After the Cold War the world finds itself under the threat of the
terrorism-sponsored states.
The collapse of the Berlin Wall removed all those barriers which, to a large extent, used
to keep apart nationalism and populism, the modern state system and the tribal societal
order. Nowadays, the coexistence and the contact, on the OSCE territory, of the emerging
global society, national culture and tribal social traditions, breed organized crime, corruption
and terrorism. All these represent the main threats to the European security. Consequently
the OSCE has to promote now a comprehensive and sophisticated inter-cultural and
inter-religions dialogue thus adding another dimension to the concept of security: that of
cultural security.
After the Cold War the culture of freedom replaced the culture of totalitarian slavery
in the whole OSCE space. However, most of the emerging democracies are inefficient and
most of the emerging markets are unfunctional. Many post communist states might be
pluralistic but their pluralism is destructive (i.e. the democracy functions in an irrational
and negative manner rather than in a rational and positive one); their markets might be free
but in the absence of a true rule of law their citizens are poor; the rule of law is more a ritual
than a permanent way of thinking and living.
Under these circumstances the negative migration has become a major undermining
factor for the European stability and security. Within this context, one of the main roles of
the OSCE is to assist each and every participating state in building compatible institutions
throughout its area, using the bricks of the respective state’s traditions. In so doing the
OSCE must find and promote policies capable of transforming the European society into
a meritocratic one and of transforming all European states into civic multicultural entities.
At the same time the OSCE has to create in Europe the cultural, social, institutional and
logistic structures, which can receive, absorb and integrate waves of migrants while
preserving the respect for diversity. On the other hand, the OSCE should identify the
appropriate cultural and economic ways of offering the peoples outside Europe a decent
future in their own countries thus giving them good reasons to stay home.
The current European and global process, characterized by new dangers for which the
consolidated democracies have not ready-made remedies, induces slowly but steadily an
ideological dimension. Terrorism is becoming an ideological enemy, which replaces
communism. If ideologically we exchange communism for terrorism we are back in the
maccartism years with all the attacks on civil liberties for the sake of the national security.
That is why the role of the OSCE today is to find a way for defending at the same time the
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civil freedoms and the collective security. Otherwise the consolidated democracies could
implode in the same way the Soviet bloc imploded not so long ago.
Finally, today’s Europe is the one of the enlargement. The enlargement of NATO and
the enlargement of the EU are now possible and necessary precisely because the post
bi-polar emerging order is characterized by new opportunities, new challenges and new
dangers which require more solidarity, more integration and more cooperation. However,
at least within a predictable future, the “enlargement process” will not embrace all the
OSCE area. What about the impact of the enlargement on the security pattern in Europe
and the Euro-Atlantic region? What about the “post enlargement security”? The OSCE
itself should find an answer to these questions and at the same time should act accordingly.
Due to its structure of membership and its field operation, the OSCE is a unique
Organization very well placed in order to cape with the above issues and to transform
those problems into challenges and those challenges into opportunities. In spite of that, the
OSCE is still an Organization in crisis. However, this crisis does not reflect a lack of need
for OSCE. It is a crisis of adaptation to the new international environment. That is why the
OSCE must be reformed.
OSCE is relevant only if it is used by the participant states collectively for reaching the
goal of their co-operative security. It would be a mistake to try to use it as a tool for the
promotion of unilateral policies, which one cannot promote within the framework of
bilateral international relations. Those who refuse to reform the OSCE simply because they
can control it for the time being are acting against their own strategic interests. At the same
time, the OSCE is useful only if it can make bold and comprehensive decisions in due time.
A slow and reactive policy, diluted messages, vague undertakings, velvet phrases, endless
Byzantine talks, a lot of energy consumed over petty issues, none of these can make OSCE
relevant. Those who want to block the Organization because they cannot control it for the
time being are also acting against their strategic interests. Finally, the OSCE is useful only
if it retains its practice of being pragmatic and not dogmatic, which means if it does not try
to impose ready-made solutions in the name of some abstract principles thus behaving like
a teacher, a judge or even worse, like a proconsul; it should behave like an adviser, an
architect and a builder who in close relation with each and every participant/interested
state correctly defines the problems, identifies the resources (both local and foreign,
traditional and modern), determines the opportunity and the feasibility of certain actions
and prescribe the remedies, plans the security structures and erect the internationally
compatible institutions. Neither the exacerbation of national distinctions nor the imposition
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of foreign models can work. All those who mislead the Organization by accepting
commitments in which they don’t believe and they have no intention of fulfilling are also
acting against their strategic goals. As long as this kind of short-sighted negative mentalities
survives, the OSCE will continue to be in crisis and more and more of our citizens will ask
themselves what this Organization is needed for and why do they have to pay taxes for the
OSCE to exist.
Definitely the OSCE does not have at its disposal the military stick of NATO, no more
than the financial and economic carrot of the EU or the moral prestige of the Council of
Europe. NATO is supposed to develop the collective defence of the Euro-Atlantic countries
against conventional and non-conventional threats. The EU is supposed to develop the
collective welfare of its member states. The Council of Europe is supposed to develop all
over the old continent the common normative basis and the collective judicial protection
for the democratic values and the human rights, thus being a real guardian of the whole
European conscience. Within such a context what is the niche of the OSCE?
The OSCE could and should undertake a political role as the general manager of “the
collective security through cooperation” process (the cooperative security) across the
Northern Hemisphere, from Bering to Bering or from San Francisco to Vladivostok and
further to Tokyo. In terms of comparative advantage, the OSCE has a more diverse, more
sophisticated and more balanced structure of membership which allow it to have, on the
one hand, a better, deeper and more nuanced knowledge and understanding about the
various realities, processes and developments in its area of jurisdiction, and, on the other
hand, more contacts with and stronger influence over the decision-makers and public
opinion agents in the same area. To this one should add the existence of its network of field
missions, which confers a clear operational capability, superior to everything else other
international organizations could display in peacetime. All these prove that the OSCE
should be normally the best placed for: the early warming actions; confidence building
measures; conflict prevention policies; fast political reaction to crisis of various nature;
policy planning for crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation; political, civil,
economic and cultural environment building for conflicts’ resolution; fast deployment of
civilian forces for crisis prevention, conflict management and post conflict rehabilitation.
Mention must be made that such unique and vast activities can be performed with full and
automatic legitimacy over a territory, which is covered neither by NATO and EU nor by
the Council of Europe.
At the same time, the OSCE is an organization which could work efficiently and
effectively in order to build those civic and multicultural states which are needed as bricks
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for the future European Federation of Nations’ house. As we have already said, the
Organization is also very much needed for the development of the post enlargement
cooperative security. Within the context of the war against terror it is the one, which could
best address the roots of the terrorism and which could offer the frame for the multicultural
dialogue and the intercultural security.
The accomplishment of these tasks requires – one must not forget – better cooperation
and less rivalry with the other international organizations which are active in more or less
the same field. A division of labour with these organizations and a system of communication,
consultation, co-ordination and cooperation should be negotiated in such a way as to
increase each of them efficiency through synergy. However, big or small, the OSCE niche
could be within the international context, this Organization should have its clear role – not
only a subsidiary status – recognized. Accordingly the OSCE must keep its own field of
jurisdiction, its capacity of initiative and its autonomy in action, thus avoiding to act just
in order to enhance the others decisions or to intervene where and when the others have
failed.
If the OSCE wants to be recognized by the others, it must be able first to define its
targets, to define its identity and to provide itself with an efficient organization and with
effective means of operation. In this respect one should stop thinking that the flexibility of
the Organization could be only preserved by the lack of clear rules; that pragmatism means
institutional incoherence; that prudence is equal to eternal vacillations; that the democratic
spirit is the same thing as a consensus principle which is reduced to an abusive single
country veto in each and every occurrence; that secret diplomacy could be introduced as
discreet diplomacy; that the legal personality of the OSCE is an automatic condemnation
to bureaucratic burden.
Based on this remarks, I shall try to briefly indicate the main topics which, I believe,
should be taken into consideration when preparing a blueprint for reforming the OSCE.
1. The hierarchy and the distribution of powers. For the time being, the OSCE
disposes, inter alia, of: a Chairman in Office appointed for one year and who is, in
fact, the foreign minister of one of the participant states (he/she is asked to provide
more chairmanship rather than leadership); a ministerial Troika which is supposed
to assure the political continuity and the minimal collegial approach at the top level;
a Permanent Council which is a kind of Ministerial Conference at the ambassadorial
level and which, even if formed by diplomats normally dependent of the instructions
coming from capitals, is considered to be and it is, in fact, the most important
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political decision making body; a Secretariat led by a Secretary General entrusted
with only technical and logistic competences. The Ministerial Conference, which is
the highest political forum of the OSCE meeting regularly (once a year) and the
OSCE Summit which meets only when it is considered to be necessary, provide, as
such, a very general political guidance and a very inconsistent political oversight.
The Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE represents the second political branch of
the Organization but its role in the decision making process is still to be defined.
What does this hierarchic structure speak for? The political leadership is weak and
slow. A Chairman in Office who has the prospective of a only one year mission, who
bears, at the same time, the burden of his/her country’s foreign policy and who is
very much limited in his/her actions by the principle of consensus in respect of the
political decisions, could not be but a soft coordinator and mostly a communicator.
The political input, impetus and vision which are supposed to come from the
capitals are either absent or hard to be coordinated.
The Permanent Council is paralysed by the need to wait for instructions and when
the instructions come from far away, they impose a minimal denominator solution
which unavoidable is placed at a very low level of consistency.
The Secretariat and the Secretary General have means but have no powers.
With their yearly meetings the Ministerial Conferences are more ritual events rather
than substantial events.
Bearing all these in mind, some possible solutions might be: a) the powers of the
CiO should be considerably increased, better defined and due to be exercised
under a stricter supervision of the Troika; b) the Troika should meet at least every
month and must be the main political structure when it is about the decision for
operative actions; c) the Secretary General should get an important political role
which he may exercise under the supervision of the Troika and the Permanent
Council; d) the Permanent Council should have the power to adopt directives and
decisions of a strategic nature which could provide with guidelines the CiO, the
Secretary General and the Troika; e) the Secretariat must organize a special
working group supposed to be the main staff of the CiO during his/her mandate
(this group will have its headquarters in the capital of the CiO); e) the Ministerial
Conference should take place twice a year; f) twice a year, between the Ministerial
Conferences, should be organized for two or three days each Permanent Council




2. The decision-making system-transparency and accountability (no secret
consensus). The CSCE, in 1975, has adopted the consensus principle as a
decision-making system able to defend each participant state’s interest above the
borders of the blocs to which they belonged. This principle was intimately linked,
in order to reach its goals, to the principle of transparency:
The disappearance of the two opposed blocs put in question the need for an
absolute and a permanent consensus as the only decision-making system in OSCE.
I believe that as long as the OSCE is a family of commitments based on a set of
shared values, in a world with diffused global threats and unfocused global
enemies, the Organization is in need for bolder, more comprehensive and faster
decisions rather than for decisions of low common denominators.
That should not mean to give up totally the rule of consensus. The consensus
should be kept when it is about adopting the commitments, the main rules of
procedure and the strategic programs as well as for the election of the Secretary
General (if he has a political role). In all other cases – including the adoption of
the budget and election of the officials who are civil servants – some other voting
rule could be used according to the case (absolute majority, qualified majority
etc.). One could also decide that, sometimes, the directly interested states have a
veto right or, in some other times, those who have a vested interest are excluded
from the vote.
However, whenever the consensus is used it should be transparent and non
abusive. In this respect, the secret consensus should be forbidden. The public
should always know who blocked a decision and on what grounds. This will make
the decision-makers accountable and thus their actions more responsible.
3. The institutional coherence. The present situation is characterized by the almost
complete independence of the OSCE’s institutions as well as by the vague mandates
each of them has. This leads to conflicting statements and divergent actions. Such
an institutional lack of coherence provides the participant states with a forum
shopping when it is about the implementation of their commitments. Some are also
using the strategy of getting the control over one of the institutions they are
afterwards using, in order to promote their priorities in disregard of the general
policy of the Organization.
A large autonomy of the OSCE institutions should be further welcomed as long as
this helps for more flexibility. However, the institutional coherence is also needed.
This makes necessary the definition of a clearer mandate for each institution and
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also the establishment of an appropriate mechanism for coordination of their
initiatives and actions. Modalities concerning the accountability of the institutions
towards the CiO, the Secretary General and /or the Permanent Council are also
needed.
4. The legal personality. In order to have a clear status, to be able of enjoying certain
rights, immunities and privileges, to formulate certain strategic interests and to
delineate its modus operandi, the OSCE should become a legal person. This will
provide predictability and certitude to both the participating states and the third
interlocutors.
Some members consider that a clear status as a prerequisite and as a consequence
of the acquiring of legal personality will diminish the flexibility of the Organization.
One should respond that clear rules do not reduce the flexibility but only the
unpredictability. The kind of the rules to be adopted and the substance of those
rules will be decisive for preserving the very much-needed flexibility. From this
prospective, one should find a solution which must respond to the global interest
of the Organization.
5. The field missions. The field missions are the most important asset of the OSCE.
Still, unfortunately, their presence in a certain country is associated with a bad
certificate given to the respective country. That is why many states feel embarrassed
by the mere presence of the field missions on their territories and are looking
forward to getting rid of them. This dangerous trend must be stopped.
The reform of the field missions would require, among others: the definition of clear
mandates for each mission based on the country and the sub regional strategies
adopted at the appropriate political level of the Organization’s leadership; the
organization of the field missions as sub-regional networks; the right labelling of
the field missions as local branches of the Organization meant to provide assistance
to the states which are crucial for the promotion of the OSCE’s global, sub-regional
and local strategies as well as to the states which are in need of such an assistance
and have asked for it.
6. The rhetoric. The OSCE is also in need of its rhetoric’s reform. The old rhetoric of
the cold war must be abandoned. No participant state is ready to accept today an
OSCE which speaks as a super inspector or a prosecutor. The present challenge
for the OSCE is not to impose the transfer of social and political models from one
state to another but to build compatible institutions in all its participant states. The
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main incentive for the enhancement of the states’ commitments is and should be
precisely the benefits of the cooperation from which the co-cooperative security
emerges. If the Organization brings benefits to its members, then the latter have all
the good reasons to fulfil the commitments which have conditioned their
membership.
In order for this rhetoric to be convincing it should be complemented with a more
balanced orientation of the OSCE’s priorities and actions from the geographical and
the topical point of view.
7. The Parliamentary dimension of the OSCE. There is no roam here for a more
elaborated presentation of this issue. I shall only say that, at present, the potential
of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly is not fully used.
I believe that the PA is a very useful means: for getting political inspiration; for
testing political ideas and initiatives; for communicating with the public opinion,
the policy makers and the parliaments in the participating states, both in order to
get support for the OSCE needs and strategies and in order to implement those
strategies; and, finally, for creating that kind of environment which is favourable
to the identification and the enhancement of political solutions to the crisis and
conflicts.
In this respect, one should find a place and a role for the PA within the decision
making process of the OSCE. Basically this would only require the recognition of
the PA’s rights to be consulted, to warn and to encourage. To this end, one should
place the relationship between the governmental and the parliamentary dimension
of the Organization, between the OSCE and its Parliamentary Assembly on the
foundations of the following five “C”‘s policy/principles: Communication,
Consultation, Co-ordination, Cooperation and Confidence.
Since the OSCE – PA is and should remain an autonomous structure at the political
level, its relations with the rest of the Organization should be regulated either
through the future general Status of the OSCE or through a special Memorandum
of Understanding to be signed between the CiO and the President of the PA
(or through both).
The last problem I would like to address would be the best procedure through which
one might reach the best blueprint for the OSCE reform. In this respect, I do not think
that the current format of discussions, which are taking place in Vienna, could lead to
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some substantial results within a reasonable frame of time. It is impossible to think that
fifty-five diplomatic representatives, inspired by a totally different opinion about the
necessity of the reform and starting from a white paper – i.e. from a no concept –, with
no clear mandate of negotiations and fully dependent of the instructions which should
come from capitals vaguely aware of the character and the substance of the whole
process, could be successful.
I believe I am truthful democrat. However, I have never found in the whole history a
great vision which has been developed from the bottom up and a great project which has
been achieved by consensus. That is why I think that a better approach would be the
appointment by the CiO and the PA’s President of a small “Wisemen Group” formed by
well-known, experienced, respected personalities having not any present executive
involvement who, in consultation with all those interested and concerned, will draft a
blueprint for the OSCE’s reform. This blueprint will be the starting concept, hopefully a
visionary one, from which the proper negotiations for change at the political official level
of the OSCE should start.
I am very well aware of the sensitive character of all these issues. I also know that some
of the above ideas are very controversial. Even more, some of them go against the actual
mainstream within the OSCE.
Nevertheless, I thought it worth formulating them since I think that the possibilities
should be considered and that any divergence in today’s opinions is and should not be a
source of conflicts but a source of richness for the so much needed debates. Even if we
cannot achieve the agreement today, this might happen tomorrow. The most important
thing is that the alternatives are on the table and that we consider them all in good faith.
Tomorrow is another day. Hopefully a better one!
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